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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF RECORDS MANAGEMENT
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Withdrawer

DLB 2/8/2010

File Folder CO002 (579000-583799)

FOIA

S10-306

Box Number 38

SYSTEMATIC

181

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
84298	MEMO	ABRAHAM SOFAER TO THE SECRETARY RE: THE AFGHANISTAN PACKAGE, MARCH 31, 1988	2	3/31/1988	B1
84299	MEMO	ROBERT OAKLEY TO COLIN POWELL, RE: ANALYSIS OF THE UN APPEAL FOR AFGHANISTAN	3	6/16/1988	B1
R 4/22/2019 NSC/STATE WAIVERS					

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

April 12, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR REBECCA RANGE

FROM: CURT ANDERSON *CA*
SUBJECT: Weyrich's press remarks

519072
C0002
C0165
ND016
ND018

I took some notes on the press conference:

Afghanistan:

"we feel that the symmetry negotiated may be theoretical and that the Paks may not be able to withstand the pressure. The President indicated that Zia will take the heat and continue to supply the mujahadin. The President said that he was going to stand by the freedom fighters. We feel that things will not change unless the current regime is replaced and that the Soviets will begin speaking in the coming months about the rebels being the only real obstacle to peace.

Q.- Are you disappointed in the President?

A. - We feel that he is well intentioned but that many times his policies do not really get carried out. We predicted in meeting with him last fall that the Nicaragua thing would fall apart as it did. We are afraid that we could be correct on Afghanistan as well, we don't want to be correct. We are encouraged by the President's statement of support, but there is always one policy here and another at the State Department. We believe that the President means well.

Kriegle also spoke briefly - "I expressed by disagreement with signing the UN accord. The pressure that will be brought to bear on Zia will be terrific and who knows if the next Administration will share the President's resolve."

(He then went on to make some remarks to a subset of reporters, not from national networks, and I did not catch what was said.)

CHILE WAS NOT DISCUSSED

SDI:

"We asked the President to do all that can be done toward deployment and urged him to meet with Sen. Nunn to resolve differences, but got no commitment on this. The President has not moved fast enough, he says he will when SDI is ready, but we have differences on that point. -- At this point Gen. Graham chimed in with his "it's ready" speech. Then Weyrich said that the Pres. assured

*Apr 12, 88 note from Rebecca Range
to Tom Griscom*

everyone that SDI is not a bargaining chip. He also said that he is concerned about the START negotiations but that the Pres. assured them that there is no rush toward such an agreement.

The press asked a bunch of questions about Larry Speaks and that whole story. Weyrich said the Pres. is ill served by these book writers that seek to capitalize on their public service. They are self serving. Peter Flaherty piped in with some strong language for those on the Hill who are criticizing the manufacture of quotes, noting that this is the standard M.O. on the hill. He referred to the Hill as a bunch of hypocrites.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: April 12, 1988

TO: Tom Griscom

FROM: REBECCA RANGE
Deputy Assistant to the
President and Director,
Office of Public Liaison

The attached is for your:

- | | |
|--|--|
| ☒ Information | ☐ Review & Comment |
| ☐ Direct Response | ☐ Appropriate Action |
| ☐ Draft Letter | ☐ Signature |
| ☐ File | ☐ Other |
| ☐ Please Return By _____ | |

Comments:

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



LCJ

✓ HB file

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April 13, 1988

Dear Mr. Baker:

Enclosed for your information is a copy of an article on your remarks on the reported agreement for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, as carried on our Wireless File April 7.

This article was transmitted to 206 posts in 127 countries. It will be translated where appropriate and released to the media in each country. Thank you for this contribution to our public affairs efforts overseas.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Marvin Stone

Marvin L. Stone
Acting Director

The Honorable
Howard H. Baker Jr.
Chief of Staff
The White House

U S I A W I R E L E S S F I L E

THIS IS THE "HOUSEWIRE," THE CENTRAL EDITION OF THE USIA WIRELESS FILE. IT IS PREPARED DAILY BY THE AGENCY'S PRESS AND PUBLICATIONS SERVICE. ARTICLES FROM THE HOUSEWIRE ARE COMBINED WITH OTHERS OF SPECIAL REGIONAL INTEREST TO FORM THE FIVE REGIONAL EDITIONS -- AFRICA, EAST ASIA/PACIFIC, EUROPE, LATIN AMERICA, NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA -- THAT ARE TRANSMITTED OVERSEAS.

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*GLP404 04/07/88

U.S. CAUTIOUS ON AFGHAN ACCORD, AGAIN STRESSES "SYMMETRY"
(Article on Powell, Baker, Oakley comments) (590)
By Alexander Sullivan and Russell Dybvik
USIA Staff Correspondents

Santa Barbara, California -- The White House says President Reagan is cautiously optimistic about the reported agreement on a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but it also is stressing that such an agreement must include "symmetry in the arrangements" for future U.S. and Soviet aid there.

Asked if his understanding is that such aid questions have in fact been settled, National Security Adviser Colin Powell replied, "That would appear to be the understanding that one could arrive at after looking at the Tashkent communique. And if that is what the Soviets understand and we get formal acknowledgment of that from the Soviets, then we do have a very positive step."

According to a dispatch by the Soviet news agency Tass, Soviet leader Gorbachev and Afghan President Najibullah, in a joint declaration issued in Tashkent, expressed their belief -- that "the final obstacles" to an Afghan settlement have been removed and said they favor immediate signing of an agreement. If that occurs rapidly, the declaration reportedly said, Soviet troops will begin leaving Afghanistan by May 15.

Powell termed the announcement "a step forward" and expressed hope that the Soviet Union will be able to fulfill its pledge to begin withdrawing by May 15. He said Washington wants to examine the "final document," and he added: "we have to have a direct formal response from the Soviets to our questions of last week."

Powell stressed the need for "symmetry in the arrangements between us and the Soviet Union, so that as long as they are able to continue providing military aid to the Kabul regime, we will retain the right to provide military aid to the mujahidin."

White House Chief of Staff Howard Baker termed "the reporting we have... certainly encouraging. It certainly appears to be a step forward."

Baker told questioners the president "was pleased with the news" but "also wants to see the fine print. He wants to

see the details of the arrangement; he wants to know the reaction, the interpretation of the Soviet Union. So the president is cautiously optimistic."

At the State Department in Washington, deputy spokesman Phyllis Oakley told reporters the United States has noted the Tass dispatch "with great interest."

"We, too, hope that rapid progress can be made in concluding the Geneva accords," Oakley said, adding that the U.S. position is clear.

"Such an agreement must be a comprehensive settlement that provides for the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops; an independent, non-aligned Afghanistan; self-determination for the Afghan people; and the return of the refugees in safety and honor," the deputy spokesman said.

She also pointed out that "we have not yet received a response from the Soviet government on our proposal" for symmetry in military assistance to the parties to the Afghan conflict -- Soviet aid to the Kabul regime and U.S. assistance to the Afghan resistance.

Until the Soviet response is received, "we must reserve judgment and further comment on the issue," Oakley said.

"Certainly we continue to adhere to the concept of symmetry and balanced reciprocal rights and obligations as the only logical interpretation of the Geneva instruments on non-intervention and non-interference," she explained.

Recalling the United States had proposed a moratorium on military assistance to the parties in Afghanistan, Oakley said that was considered to be "negative symmetry. That wasn't acceptable. So now we're looking at the positive symmetry."

NNNN

ID # 579643

0002

WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING☐ H - INTERNAL☒ I - INCOMINGDate Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)

88.04.27

Name of Correspondent:

HON GORDON HUMPHREY

☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes:

(A)

~~SECRETARY~~

(B)

(C)

Subject:

ASKS PRESIDENT TO RECOGNIZE THE AFGHAN
RESISTANCE ALLIANCE AS THE GOVERNMENT OF
AFGHANISTAN

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
LAKRAN		ORIGINATOR	88.04.28	TR	A	88.05.02
NSP/OWE	Secretariat	R	88.05.14	TR	C	88.05.16
LAKRAN		A	88.05.05	TR	C	88.05.23

ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action
C - Comment/Recommendation
D - Draft Response
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
to be used as Enclosure

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Code	Date	Comment	Form
C	_____	Time: _____	P- _____
DSP	_____	Time: _____	Media: _____

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 M - Mailgram
 O - Memo
 P - Photo
 R - Report
 S - Sealed
 T - Telegram
 V - Telephone
 X - Miscellaneous
 Y - Study

May 2, 1988

Dear Senator:

The President appreciates having your letter of April 26 urging that the United States officially recognize the Afghan Resistance Alliance. He enjoyed his visit with you -- as did I.

I can assure you that your letter will be reviewed carefully by ranking Administration officials, and you will receive a more detailed response in the near future.

With our thanks and best wishes,

Cordially,

Alan M. Kranowitz
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Gordon J. Humphrey
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

AMK:KRJ:JWR:jwr

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat -- for DIRECT
cc: w/copy of inc to Ed Fox, Congressional Affairs, STATE --
fyi

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AMK:KRJ:JWR:jwr

cc: w/copy of inc to NSC Secretariat -- for DIRECT

cc: w/copy of inc to Ed Fox, Congressional Affairs, STATE --
fyi

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Maiken

As requested.
Nice doing
business

with you -

E. J. Curson

X-3950

NSC

Room 351

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4

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510
April 26, 1988

3155
COMMITTEES
ARMED SERVICES
JUDICIARY

LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES

579643

The President
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Three weeks ago I returned from Pakistan where I met with the leaders of the Afghan Resistance Alliance. As I outlined in an urgent cable I sent to you from Islamabad, during my meeting, the leaders reiterated their call for official recognition by the United States.

Your long-standing support for the Alliance has been an important element in their success. Since your first meeting with the Alliance leadership in June 1986, they have made remarkable progress. The Resistance now controls almost 80% of the territory of Afghanistan. They have drawn a plan for an interim government. They have represented the people of Afghanistan at the United Nations and the Islamic Conference. Their increased cohesiveness on the battlefield has secured an historic Soviet commitment to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan. As you noted, Mr. President, "the diversity of the Alliance, its roots in the faith and traditions of Afghanistan, shows that the Alliance is the true representative of the Afghan people."

Mr. President, last November the United States Senate unanimously adopted a resolution honoring the accomplishments of the Resistance Alliance and reaffirming support for the Alliance as the "representatives of the Afghan people in their struggle for freedom."

With the signing of the Geneva Accords, the time has come for the United States to move toward recognition of the Alliance. I met recently with Pakistan's Foreign Minister Zain Noorani. During our meeting, Mr. Noorani indicated that Pakistan is prepared to recognize the Alliance, as soon as they establish an interim government in Afghanistan. I urge our government to convey to the leaders of the Alliance and the Government of Pakistan, that the United States also stands ready to confer recognition.


There is clear precedent for recognizing the Alliance. Our nation takes great pride in our recognition of the Polish government in exile in 1939.

The President
April 26, 1988
Page #2

There are two choices. Either we continue to fly our flag at the seat of a regime responsible for the deaths of more than one million people, or we take tangible steps to confer legitimacy upon those who are successfully restoring independence to their own nation. Mr. President, you said it best when you remarked that the only voice that really counts is "that of the Afghan people, speaking through their resistance representatives."

With warmest regards, I am

Sincerely yours,



Gordon J. Humphrey, USS

GJH/tk

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8803185
RECEIVED: 27 APR 88 08

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: HUMPHREY, GORDON J

DOC DATE: 26 APR 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: AFGHANISTAN

NCO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE LEADER OF AFGHANISTAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POWELL

DUE DATE: 30 APR 88

STATUS: S

STAFF OFFICER: TAHIR-KHELI

LOGREF:

FILES: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

D O C U M E N T D I S T R I B U T I O N

FOR ACTION
TAHIR-KHELI

FOR CONCURRENCE
FORTIER
LEDSKY
RODMAN
ROSS

FOR INFO
CURTIN
OAKLEY
ROSTOW

COMMENTS:

CBZ PER SRT

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSRCB

CLOSED BY:

DOC 1 OF 1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
NSC/S PROFILE

RECORD ID: 8873155
RECEIVED: 27 APR 88 08

TO: PRESIDENT

FROM: HUMPHREY, GORDON J

DOC DATE: 26 APR 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: AFGHANISTAN

NCO

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: LTR RE LEADER OF AFGHANISTAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE

ACTION: OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN DUE DATE: 30 APR 88 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: TAHIR-KHELI

LOGREF:

FILE: WH

NSCIF:

CODES:

DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION

FOR ACTION
TAHIR-KHELI

FOR CONCURRENCE
FORTIER
LEDSKY
RODMAN
ROSS

FOR INFO
CURTIN
OAKLEY
ROSTOW

COMMENTS: *** ADD TO FILE ***

DISPATCHED BY _____ DATE _____ W/ATTCH: YES NO

OPENED BY: NSRCB

CLOSED BY: NSCTF

DOC 1 OF 1

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UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8803185

DOC ACTION OFFICER

001 TAHIR-KHELI
001

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

Z 88042708 PREPARE MEMO FOR POWELL
X 88091214 OBE / STATUS ORIGINAL UNKNOWN

UNCLASSIFIED

sg

~~Secret~~ Attachment

MD
3/30/10

CF

ID #

580539

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WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

☐ O - OUTGOING

☐ H - INTERNAL

☐ I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence
Received (YY/MM/DD)

1 / 1

Name of Correspondent: Nicholas Pastore

☐ MI Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: The Afghanistan Package, March 31, 1988

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

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<u>Cuhok</u>	ORIGINATOR	<u>88.04.11</u>		<u>C 88.04.11</u>
<u>Cuculo</u>	Referral Note: <u>I</u>	<u>88.04.11</u>		<u>C 88.04.11</u>
	Referral Note: _____	<u>1 / 1</u>		<u>1 / 1</u>
	Referral Note: _____	<u>1 / 1</u>		<u>1 / 1</u>
	Referral Note: _____	<u>1 / 1</u>		<u>1 / 1</u>
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CO 119
FO 009

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84298 MEMO

2 3/31/1988 B1

ABRAHAM SOFAER TO THE SECRETARY RE:
THE AFGHANISTAN PACKAGE, MARCH 31, 1988

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Authority NAC/State Wawers

by db NARA DATE 4/22/2019

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RB*

SUBJECT: Analysis of the UN Appeal for Afghanistan

Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the newly appointed Coordinator for UN Humanitarian and Economic Assistance for Afghanistan left a copy of the UN appeal with the President. John Negroponte suggested that a summary of the highlights may be helpful to you in briefing the President. The complete text is at Tab A.

The appeal is based on the premise that Afghan refugee, relief and rehabilitation work is in the international community's interest, a moral debt owed to the Afghan people. The UN is the appropriate vehicle for such assistance because the humanitarian role can be separated from the purely political, enabling all nations to contribute to a multilateral effort, and for all groups inside Afghanistan to become recipients of the relief and resettlement assistance. Given the many international organizations, bilateral governmental programs and volunteer agencies who will be helping the effort to put Afghanistan back on its feet, it is essential to have a single coordinator. The intricacy and magnitude of both the donor coordination and on-the-ground phases of the effort are such that the only hope for success lies in a strong, experienced, widely respected individual to run it. We suggested Sadruddin Khan to the Secretary General on the basis of his past record as head of UNHCR, his international stature and his deep knowledge of Afghanistan and South Asia.

In his meeting with the President, Prince Sadruddin summed up the projected UN program as: "building on traditional Afghan self-reliance." The primary effort in the resettlement and reconstruction phase of the UN's program (which will only come when substantial numbers of refugees have returned to Afghanistan and there is some semblance of peace) focuses on the food-for-work and cash-for-work programs whereby Afghans themselves rebuild their country. The refugee return phase will require UN involvement from Pakistan, Iran and inside Afghanistan. Sadruddin has the green light from Moscow and Kabul for cross-border activities from neighboring countries and action in Resistance-controlled areas of Afghanistan as well as working through Kabul.

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Declassify: OADR

NSC 8804455

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

June 16, 1988

C.F.
583798
12/6
4455
64297
0002
FO003-02
IT086
FG006-12
1
Hold
1
cc: [unclear]
Toronto.
3

*Not Sec Advisor
has seen*

The bulk of UN support is expected from the West, Japan and the Islamic countries although Sadrudin will go to Moscow in July to press the Soviets to contribute generously to multilateral assistance. The President urged Sadrudin to move forward quickly because Gorbachev may find such assistance helpful in fostering the more positive world image he now seeks. The UN appeal notes that clearing (Soviet laid) mines in Afghanistan is a high priority item and is currently estimated to cost approximately \$9 million.

The UN appeal paints a comprehensive picture of the destruction the Soviets and their PDPA puppets have wrought on Afghanistan since 1979. The displacement of people -- over 5 million as refugees in Pakistan and Iran; several million dislocated within Afghan borders; hundreds of thousands injured; as many killed -- gives an illustration of the human costs of Soviet occupation. In addition, Afghanistan has also suffered intensive damage to all sectors of its economy, e.g., as much as 40 per cent of all traditional irrigation systems which were the backbone of previous Afghan self-sufficiency in food, have been destroyed, damaged or fallen into disuse and disrepair. The international effort will provide the wherewithal for short-term relief to vulnerable groups and for repairs of services and infrastructure in order to rapidly enable communities toward a minimum level of self-reliance. Basic inputs will be provided by the UN to cover such essentials as seeds, tools, irrigation, animals, primary health care, drinking water, education, housing and rural transport.

The UN will gear its program to the village rather than the institutional level, which is realistic given the absence of nationwide institutions in Afghanistan and the certainty that most real power for the next several years will be at the local level (e.g. in the hands of Resistance commanders and tribal leaders). Such an approach also helps prevent the bulk of the assistance from being channeled through the Kabul government. The relief program recognizes a key point: returning an area to stability and security is a pre-requisite to attracting large numbers of Afghans back to their homes. The assumption is that as particular regions become peaceful, mine-free and the UN effort gets underway, the refugees will begin to return in large numbers.

The overall UN program has two phases. The first phase provides for immediate relief and rehabilitation which is to be implemented as rapidly as conditions permit. Refugees are expected to return within an 18 month timeframe. The total costs of the first phase is nearly \$1.7 billion. The second "recovery" phase focuses on longer term reconstruction of Afghanistan's infrastructure and will take an additional three years at an estimated minimum cost of \$839 million.

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Prepared by:
Shirin Tahir-Kheli

Attachment

Tab A Appeal

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CONFERENCE ON UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN
AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMMES
RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN
New York, 14 June 1988

APPEAL OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Report prepared by the Co-ordinator for United Nations Humanitarian
and Economic Assistance Programmes relating to Afghanistan

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Foreword by the Secretary-General

Today, in Afghanistan, the United Nations system faces a historic opportunity at the same time as it carries a heavy responsibility. The international community must mobilize a vast relief and rehabilitation effort in the cause of peace. Here is a nation at the brink; on the one side lies the possibility of further suffering, on the other, the prospect that the urgent commitment of humanitarian assistance can make a decisive contribution to alleviating that suffering.

The opportunity for the international community depends in large measure on separating the humanitarian mission from the political role of the United Nations. Economic and humanitarian assistance should not be used for the purpose of influencing political developments which can only be the result of the free expression by the Afghan people of their wishes.

This appeal is the first outcome of the collaborative effort of the United Nations system, and the appointment of the Co-ordinator is the first expression of this effort. I hope that the whole international community, bilateral donors and the non-governmental sector as well as the United Nations system would abide by the priorities, parameters and guidelines that the Co-ordinator is developing on my behalf.

It is essential that all Afghans in need, wherever they are located, are reached by a programme dedicated to the recovery of self-reliance. That is the challenge. I urge you all to contribute with the utmost generosity to this appeal whose ambition goes beyond the alleviation of suffering to the roots of the United Nations original mission. We can once again demonstrate that international solidarity is not a rhetorical and empty expression, but a concrete manifestation of how the community of nations can work together.

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar
Secretary-General

Introduction

"When I remember the mountain tops of my Afghan land,
If I must choose between it and the world,
I shall not hesitate to claim its barren deserts as my own."

Ahmad Shah Durrani

1. The Afghan people face a crisis of hope. The opportunity is there to begin rebuilding their lives after years of conflict. Yet it is as precarious a path as any of those that cross Afghanistan's high mountain ranges. Unless the essential needs of normal life can be quickly met, hope may be just as quickly followed by despair and renewed suffering.
2. The Afghan people's opportunity is also the international community's. Today, we have the chance to drive in the wedge that will support their future. The international community, not just the United Nations but all the donors, governmental and non-governmental agencies alike, should join in facilitating the Afghans' journey to dignity, peace and honour.
3. We can succeed in this bold mission, however, only if we respect its humanitarian character. The Secretary-General has clearly distinguished this co-ordinated humanitarian effort from his political good offices. The international community must establish the humanitarian framework within which it can operate. The co-ordinated programme will seek to reach all Afghans in need, wherever they may be located. It must also assist them to come home when they freely choose to do so.
4. The co-ordinated programme of the United Nations system is the result of a series of collaborative undertakings involving the different agencies and programmes of the United Nations system. This has involved an inter-agency meeting in New York on 28 and 29 April 1988, followed by extensive technical consultations and the pooling of information under the direction of the Co-ordinator including an informal inter-agency meeting on 23 May at Geneva. In the month since his appointment on 11 May 1988, the Co-ordinator has visited the executive heads of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO), in New York, Geneva and Rome. He also had consultations with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LRCS). He led a mission to the region at the end of May and had extensive discussions with the Governments of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan.
5. He was accompanied on this mission by the Administrator of UNDP, as well as representatives of FAO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, WHO and LRCS. Following his return and that of a supporting team, a further round of consultations was held at Geneva to finalize the details of the present appeal.

6. The appeal has been prepared with such urgency because, while the situation in Afghanistan may not conform to the classic concept of emergencies, this is precisely the moment when a decisive humanitarian intervention by the international community can make the difference. It reflects a co-ordinated effort of the United Nations system while paying due regard to the role of UNHCR relating to the voluntary repatriation of refugees under the relevant bilateral agreement of the Geneva Accords. It seeks to ensure that the United Nations responds in a concerted manner, so as to maximize the impact of assistance programmes.

7. Here is a country whose people have suffered death and desolation. Few Afghan families have been unaffected. In addition to the many who died on the battlefield, large numbers have become victims of widespread internal disruption. Countless thousands have been disabled for life. Everywhere there are widows and orphans.

8. Millions of Afghans, men, women and children, have left their homes and become refugees. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran reports 2.4 million refugees and that of Pakistan a total of 3.1 million refugees. Several million are thought to have been displaced within the frontiers of Afghanistan. There are hundreds of thousands still bearing the injuries of war. The traditional patterns of population distribution have been dramatically altered, putting extraordinary pressure on the fragile infrastructures and slender food resources of many regions of the country.

9. In addition to its human losses, Afghanistan has also suffered extensive damage to all sectors of its economy. The precise dimensions of the tragedy remain to be ascertained. What is offered in this appeal is no more than the first outlines of a picture that must be completed in the coming months.

10. Today there is a strong chance that peace might be restored to Afghanistan. A basic framework for a gradual return to peaceful conditions is already in place. But peace is still but a fragile sapling in Afghanistan, threatened by the many storms on the horizon. Peace needs to be nurtured and protected.

11. That is primarily a task for the Afghan people themselves but they need international support. The return of peace to Afghanistan requires the implementation of major relief and rehabilitation projects capable of helping to revive the nation's economy and to ensure confidence in its future. The Afghans, are proud, hardworking and industrious people who value self-reliance and enterprise. The task at hand is to help them to help themselves. What is needed is a grass-roots, people-oriented effort.

12. Afghanistan, a mosaic of peoples and languages, is an example of unity in diversity. There is no intention of imposing a uniform pattern of rehabilitation where local initiatives, supported by international effort, might produce better results. The programme is intended to restore to Afghans their self-reliance, not to encourage a new dependency on international aid.

13. The problem Afghanistan is facing today is not a routine problem of displaced persons. Much of the country's economic and social life must be regenerated. Together, the international community and the Afghans have much to do and no time to waste. Wherever possible, the rehabilitation must be closely linked with the provision of relief.

I. PROGRAMME AND ROLE OF THE CO-ORDINATOR

A. The programme

14. The programme has two phases, both of which have been costed as fully as available information permits. The first phase is immediate relief and rehabilitation which will be implemented as rapidly as conditions permit. For planning purposes, bearing in mind the agricultural cycles and projections for the expected return of refugees, an 18-month time-frame has been allotted for this phase. The total costs of this first phase amounts to \$US 1,166.1 million (see table 1).

15. The second recovery phase consists of the longer-term rehabilitation of the country's infrastructure and follows from the first. A further three-year period is assumed for this second phase, with needs so far identified costing about \$839.6 million (see table 2). This projection is necessarily tentative at the present time and does not form part of the current appeal except in so far as some donors may wish to make a long-term commitment to Afghanistan's recovery and plan now for the future by making a multi-year pledge.

16. During the years of conflict, Afghanistan has foregone many forms of foreign aid that a country of its per capita income might have expected. There have, of course, been limited United Nations programmes inside Afghanistan. In addition, there has been bilateral assistance. Nevertheless, there has been almost a decade of lost opportunities for development, as against relief, in much of Afghanistan.

17. At a later stage, when the situation permits, the international community could also help Afghanistan to make up for the years of development lost. At this point in time, it is hoped that the activities of the financial institutions will dovetail with these recovery activities at an appropriate stage.

18. For the immediate future, though, the priority is to make prompt operational arrangements that will meet the vast relief and rehabilitation demands. It is clear that the conditions inside Afghanistan, the impressive but limited capacities of the relief agencies to function inside the country and the constraints on the reach of public services make it unrealistic to attempt a nation-wide rehabilitation effort at the present stage.

19. We must start where we can. At every step the Co-ordinator will have the task of matching the unlimited needs against the limited absorption capacity. He has set himself certain criteria for deciding, together with his colleagues from the United Nations system, in which regions of the country relief and rehabilitation operations can be satisfactorily initiated. These criteria are:

(a) The presence of large numbers of vulnerable people in need of assistance, be they returnees, internally displaced persons, war injured, women, children or others;

(b) The reasonable assurance that an area has returned to stability and security and that it is safe for people to return. One critical condition for security is that an area has been adequately cleared of mines;

(c) Access to the area for United Nations staff and other project personnel to ensure the programme's consistency with the humanitarian principles of the operation as well as its effectiveness;

(d) Accessibility of an area for the materials and supplies required for the operation; logistical problems must be overcome.

20. Following his visit to the region, it is the Co-ordinator's view that there are a number of areas which can be provisionally identified as meeting these conditions. Further fact-finding missions to the area will be undertaken to confirm this. It is critical that the first confidence-building projects begin as soon as possible.

21. An integrated approach in the locations covered is proposed. Together with implementing partners that accept the humanitarian principles of the mission, the Co-ordinator will establish a range of decentralized services, including immediate short-term relief to vulnerable groups, and of services and infrastructure repairs that will raise communities to a minimum level of self-reliance as rapidly as possible.

22. So, in any given area where operations are initiated, an attempt will be made to provide a minimum slate of services. These will include initial food aid to returnees and internally displaced persons as well as vulnerable groups. The longer-term food-for-work programmes will be linked to infrastructure repairs. This latter phase will be monitored to ensure that the provision of food aid encourages the return to agricultural self-sufficiency and other productive activities.

23. In addition, basic inputs covering such essentials as seeds, tools, irrigation, draught animals, primary health care, drinking water, education, housing and rural transport will be provided. In a fragmented land, the approach must inevitably be geographically piecemeal but it must also be intensive as the recovery and rehabilitation activities are extended to each region of the country as the situation permits.

24. If the inputs are standard, the output should not be. Afghanistan is a land of diversity. If the assistance is responsive to and driven by the grass-roots needs of the Afghans it is intended to help, the programme will yield as many different fruits as its beneficiaries choose to derive from it.

25. It is clear that implementation will primarily rely on the energy and resourcefulness of the Afghan people themselves. The assistance of the United Nations system as well as ICRC, LRCS and the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) will, however, be critical. This operational chain must adhere to the humanitarian, non-political guidelines that the Co-ordinator will provide.

B. The role of the Co-ordinator

26. The Co-ordinator's functions may be summed up as follows:

(a) Central co-ordination of the various components of the action undertaken within the United Nations system on behalf of the Secretary-General;

(b) Monitoring of operations in the context of an integrated United Nations programme of humanitarian and economic aid while implementation remains the responsibility of the agency concerned;

(c) Discussion and negotiation with all concerned parties, when necessary, as the spokesman for the United Nations system;

(d) Direction and organization of special tasks not within the mandate of any given United Nations agency;

(e) Adoption of a flexible and geographically decentralized approach to meeting humanitarian and economic needs on the basis of a realistic assessment of implementation and absorption capacity area by area.

27. The United Nations system has made growing use of co-ordinators to provide leadership among individual agencies when responding to a complex crisis. The appointment of co-ordinators has been welcomed as a significant measure for enhancing effectiveness, eliminating duplication and increasing the confidence of donors in the responsiveness of the United Nations system.

28. The Co-ordinator sees as a first priority the development of an information system in order to provide more solid ground for planning. There have been impressive, but necessarily partial, surveys carried out inside Afghanistan seeking to measure physical damage and crop loss. A lot of data, however, really only covers the main urban centres at this point. The data base will include both an extension of such work and also satellite imagery and other such techniques to build up a comprehensive picture of the Afghan people's condition. It will vary widely from region to region. Such a system must also be predictive: where are refugees likely to move back to? Will the current overflow populations of cities and towns return to their rural areas? The new demographics of the country in the recovery phase will not be a replica of what they were 10 years earlier. Despite the conflict, and in many ways because of it, a process of social and economic change is under way in Afghanistan that cannot be ignored in planning for recovery.

29. Even before recovery, in the emergency relief and rehabilitation phase, there are elements of uncertainty that point to the need to give the Co-ordinator and his colleagues in the agencies maximum flexibility. In the midst of continued hostilities, it is vital that donors do not hold back; they must give the United Nations system the means to drive in a humanitarian wedge for peace. However, with the pace of repatriation still unclear, the Co-ordinator must retain flexibility over the use of resources. This will enable the appropriate agencies to start grass-roots rehabilitation efforts in areas where security has been restored, where there are people already in need and where, in the near future, many more may return and impose themselves on a weakened infrastructure.

30. The selection of geographic target areas of operation for the United Nations programme will hopefully give donors the assurance of operational effectiveness. Nevertheless, difficulties in implementation will remain, and one of the functions of the Co-ordinator will be to monitor projects. He in no way sees this task as replacing the agencies' own responsibilities to report on the use of funds but rather as measuring the impact of projects on beneficiaries. If projects do not have the expected impact, he will reserve the right to review the priorities.

31. There are certain tasks that do not fall within the mandates of the agencies. In the case of the Afghan people, the most urgent is mine clearance. The Co-ordinator has already initiated a series of discussions with concerned parties and hopes to arrive at a satisfactory plan of action.

32. Finally, the needs of the Afghan people pose a challenge to the capacity of the United Nations system and its many partners in this operation to deliver assistance in an effective and appropriate way. A decentralized approach has been adopted in a double sense: target areas will be selected and, within those areas, services will be delivered at a decentralized local level so that people will settle back permanently in their home areas and not find themselves on a migratory treadmill, dependent upon relief distribution centres. The fundamental purpose of this programme is to link people back to their homes and engender self-reliance in order to avoid institutionalizing relief.

II. VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION

33. The voluntary repatriation of refugees in their homeland is the most desirable durable solution to a refugee problem. The specific international protection mandate of the High Commissioner and the capacity of his Office to ensure an international presence alongside refugees and returnees over the years have been vital to the success of voluntary repatriation programmes.

34. A large-scale repatriation operation will require international support both in the immediate future, as refugees return, and in the medium term as they assume their rightful place in Afghan society and participate in the wider rehabilitation effort. Activities related to the identification, transfer of refugees returning to Afghanistan and the provision of assistance to them must go hand in hand with assistance to internally displaced persons returning to their homes and, to a

limited extent, the most affected local population in areas of returnee concentration. UNHCR's principal concern, however, will be the protection of and assistance to refugees during their repatriation.

35. The initial plan of operations developed jointly by UNHCR and WFP includes a number of assumptions. Firstly, many will return spontaneously and may not require assistance for transportation. Secondly, internally displaced persons returning to their homes in rural areas may also need temporary food assistance. Finally, with the uncertainty about the numbers of refugees who will return, the volume of assistance including food now being provided to the refugee population in Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran should not initially be reduced.

36. The budgetary approach is based on:

(a) The identification and costing of the basic infrastructure and services that will need to be set in place irrespective of the size of any population movement. This includes storage, vehicles and personnel of the UNHCR and WFP joint logistics unit;

(b) The estimated cost of assisting a basic "module" of 250,000 people, excluding food aid, for a period of one year;

(c) Owing to the delays inherent in food deliveries and for prudent management, the planning of food stocks to be available initially for at least four "modules". Each module will consist of 250,000 people over a maximum of 12 months. Costs for food items are included in the general food budget submitted by WFP.

37. The programme of assistance must be as flexible as possible, particularly in the initial stages, as conditions inside Afghanistan will vary from one area to another. Implementation arrangements and the choice of operational partners will be subject to local considerations. Assistance will be in three phases as described below.

A. Organization and protection before leaving the country of asylum

38. Protection. An essential element in any organized return is to ensure that refugees are voluntarily returning from their country of asylum. UNHCR will ascertain the voluntary character of the repatriation.

39. Monitoring of refugee movements. UNHCR and WFP will establish food distribution facilities inside Afghanistan if it is clearly seen that returnees are arriving in a particular area in sufficient numbers to warrant UNHCR intervention.

40. Health. An expanded programme of immunization (EPI) in refugee villages in Pakistan is being prepared by UNHCR in collaboration with UNICEF and WHO. The target is to immunize 80 per cent of Afghan refugee children before the end of 1988. As most refugee children are in satisfactory health, this is the single most effective preventive health measure that can be taken prior to their return to Afghanistan.

B. Assistance en route

41. Transport. Arrangements will be made to transport those refugees who choose to return under an organized return programme together with their belongings. Transport for both people and supplies will be provided through a combination of commercial vehicles and others purchased by, or donated to, the programme. A joint UNHCR/WFP logistics unit is foreseen to ensure the safe transport of food and other relief items as well as of returnees.

42. Transit facilities. Many refugees live within a day's travel of their villages of origin. However, in case of long distances or when appropriate, transit facilities will be established both for logistics purposes and to ensure the welfare of returnees as they travel from their refugee villages to their eventual destinations. Food, water, health care and temporary shelter facilities will be provided and the monitoring of refugee movements undertaken.

C. Operational facilities

43. Facilities will be established in areas of returnee concentration to provide an outreach system of commodity distribution and related services in the area. The precise locations for the distribution of food and supplies will be decided as sufficient information on refugee movements within the provinces in Afghanistan becomes available. Beneficiaries under the programme will have access to these facilities while they rebuild their home villages. It is currently planned, subject to a further assessment of all relevant factors, to distribute the following items:

(a) Shelter. Provision will be made for the purchase of approximately 80,000 tents and 240,000 tarpaulines that some returnees will have to use as family shelters until their personal dwellings can be repaired or rebuilt;

(b) Household goods. Quilts, plastic buckets and portable stoves will be provided to assist beneficiaries in their initial resettlement efforts;

(c) Agricultural assistance. UNHCR will purchase and distribute seeds and agricultural implements to returnees to enable them to begin basic agricultural rehabilitation.

44. The form of assistance provided may differ from one region to another, particularly as concerns shelter and agricultural assistance. The availability of food, marketing facilities and, wherever possible, the beneficiaries' own ability to sustain themselves will be considered through a process of local assessment.

D. Food

45. General food distribution in Afghanistan will be limited to 12 months on the assumption that this will allow returnees adequate time for one harvest. The food ration to be provided to the returning population will be in line with that

initially provided to Afghan refugees in Pakistan, namely, 500 grams of wheat, 30 grams of oil, 20 grams of sugar and 3 grams of tea. Milk and pulses, in small quantities, will also be needed for supplementary feeding programmes. The number of persons and the time-frame involved for the returnee repatriation programme, to be monitored by UNHCR and WFP staff, will be adjusted in accordance with the actual flow.

46. To ensure the availability of food for the large number of returnees anticipated, food commodities will be positioned in the region to cover the expected needs of 1 million beneficiaries.

E. Financial requirements

47. The financial requirements for voluntary repatriation are linked entirely to the number of returnees and the period of time over which they move. Regardless of the pattern of returnee movements, UNHCR and WFP are obliged to establish the essential infrastructure and purchase the necessary equipment for a repatriation operation, whether organized or spontaneous. The operation will be conducted on the assumption that, although refugees may decide to return in a sporadic manner, nearly all will repatriate within the foreseeable future and that substantial investment must be made as soon as possible to cover the eventuality of a significant initial return. Provision must also be made for ongoing expenditure on essential services. These costs, together with the purchase of equipment for the programme are indicated in annex I to the present report, whereas food requirements are included in the section on food aid.

III. FOOD AID AND RELATED LOGISTICAL SUPPORT

48. The food-aid component of this appeal covers three broad areas:

- (a) The expected returnee movement from Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran;
- (b) Internally displaced Afghans and severely affected local populations;
- (c) Food-for-work rehabilitation activities.

49. Reduced agricultural output and productivity losses during the past years will result in initial, but hopefully temporary, problems when large sections of the Afghan population return home. Structural food deficits will be amplified by mass movements that may conceivably not only deplete existing national food resources but also reduce the level of self-sufficiency of those who have remained in their home areas.

50. While it is likely that seasonal and agricultural crop cycles will have some bearing on the timing of the return and rehabilitation of the uprooted people, it may not be prudent to rely on such factors alone in preparing for the eventuality of mass movements within a short time.

51. Uncertainties about patterns of repatriation and the degree of need inside Afghanistan make it difficult to predict the number of beneficiaries that may have to be temporarily sustained or assisted by food aid, be it in the form of unconditional relief assistance, food for work or other nutritional support programmes.

52. Within the relief time-frame of 18 months, individual beneficiaries would receive assistance over a period of up to 12 months or less if the circumstances so warrant. As programmes get under way, there may be cases when assistance beyond 12 months will be justified. Similarly, food aid earmarked for any one category of beneficiaries may be redirected to alternative categories and activities. Donors should therefore allow for maximum flexibility when making their pledges.

53. A modular approach designed jointly by WFP and UNHCR will be retained as the basis for budgeting assistance to returning refugees. The suggested costing of this component assumes that the majority of refugees will choose to return within an 18-month period. Once the immediate needs of returnees are met, they will enter the transition period of rehabilitation, during which the re-establishment of their own agricultural and economic bases will be supported, when appropriate, by food-for-work programmes.

54. Parallel to assistance to returnees, internally displaced and severely war-affected people will be considered eligible for similar assistance from WFP. The primary criterion for all assistance will be actual need. Returnees will not be treated as a privileged group. However, in many cases, the transition from pure relief to rehabilitation may be more rapid for those not dislocated. Their own farming areas may also be restored more rapidly.

55. Traditional food-for-work rehabilitation activities will primarily concentrate on self-help initiatives at the farm and village level to reactivate the economy and allow Afghans, whether or not they have been refugees or internally displaced, to achieve self-reliance in the shortest possible time. Activities will include reconstruction of houses, clearing of land, restoration of irrigation and drainage systems, repair of primary and secondary roads, rehabilitation of water structures, building and repair of schools, clinics and first-aid centres, etc., in short all that would help to put a community back on its feet.

56. Naturally, such activities require additional financial and material support which is expected to be channelled mainly through other agencies and NGOs. However, even reasonably funded rural works often require essential basic tools and implements. Normally, an amount of \$60 per labourer is recognized as adequate to cover such essential support items as spades, hoes, picks, wheel-barrows, wire, cement, etc.

57. To extend the necessary support to vulnerable groups, a relatively small programme to benefit pregnant and nursing women as well as pre-school age children is proposed, to be operated essentially through UNICEF and NGOs. An in-depth assessment of needs is foreseen as soon as circumstances allow, which will eventually lead to a medium- to long-term strategy. Likewise, a limited school

feeding programme is proposed for immediate assistance in villages where the massive return of refugees and displaced persons may result in the ad hoc creation of schools.

58. Transport costs of food aid have been calculated to cover both maritime freight and overland/inland transportation costs into provincial capitals, as well as to final distribution centres inside Afghanistan. To the extent possible, the very considerable commercial trucking capacity of neighbouring countries will be utilized. The necessary arrangements are being made to permit transit movements into Afghanistan.

59. Notwithstanding the existence of such facilities, it is essential to set up an independent transport and distribution capacity to cover any unexpected eventuality that might disrupt the repatriation and relief effort. Accordingly, a modest provision is made for a small fleet of 75 trucks, to be managed and operated jointly by WFP and UNHCR. This unit will be expected to handle the movement of food and returnees and their belongings, as well as basic survival and relief items.

60. Considering the magnitude of the operation, the additional staffing proposals are very conservative and represent, in terms of cost, less than 1 per cent of the proposed food-aid programme, partly because it is intended to utilize, to the extent possible, the present staff in WFP offices, as well as locally available trained manpower. Food aid requirements, together with transport costs for the programme, are indicated in annex II.

IV. AGRICULTURE, IRRIGATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT

61. The restoration of national productive capacity in the agricultural sector is fundamental to the economic recovery of rural Afghanistan. Since 1978/79 agricultural production has steadily declined. Some estimates suggest the decline to be half the previous level. Labour shortages as a result of armed conflict, the destruction or disuse of irrigation systems, heavy losses of livestock and other factors have all adversely affected the situation.

A. Agricultural commodities

62. FAO's strategy for recovery underpinning this appeal aims at redressing directly the situation at the grass-roots level. Proposed agricultural commodity inputs include seeds, fertilizers, farm tools, draught animals, small tractors, animal feed and animal vaccines against rinderpest and foot-and-mouth disease. Some 50,000 tons of wheat seed, 5,000 tons of cotton seed and 1,000 tons of vegetable seed to cover two planting seasons will be provided along with 50,000 tons of urea and 100,000 tons of phosphates. A comprehensive package of farm tools will be supplied to help to restore abandoned land holdings to cultivation and, as appropriate, oxen or tractors will be provided for ploughing.

B. Infrastructural and technical assistance to agriculture

63. Assistance to the rehabilitation of the agricultural infrastructure will have as its main objective the strengthening of services providing credit, fertilizer, seed, veterinary and crop extension services to the rural farming population. The entire local seed industry will need to be progressively rehabilitated and, where appropriate, supported by genetic research. Tree nurseries should be re-established, both to restore fruit orchards and to aid reforestation and the supply of fuelwood. Rural wheat procurement as well as storage and distribution capacity will also be strengthened.

64. Technical assistance needs to be provided to support the outreach operations of the institutions involved, as well as the replanting of tree crops, relevant applied research, livestock production and improved capacity to service agricultural machinery.

65. The relief and rehabilitation needs envisaged for the agricultural sector total \$226.1 million over the 18-month period as indicated in annex III. Of this figure, by far the greater part, or \$169.3 million, consists of agricultural commodities such as seeds, fertilizers, farm tools and draught animals to meet urgent recovery needs. The remaining \$56.8 million relates to the rehabilitation of the agricultural infrastructure and to technical assistance. Agriculture is the backbone of the Afghan economy and it is essential that agricultural rehabilitation and recovery are given high priority. Within the five-year programme, the total needs are estimated at \$432.1 million.

C. Irrigation

66. Some estimates suggest that as much as 40 per cent of all traditional irrigation systems, including the underground channels known as "karez", have been destroyed, damaged or fallen into disuse and disrepair. The destruction has been a major contributory factor to the reduction of yields on irrigated land or the abandonment of land on which irrigation has become impossible. In the modern irrigation sector, five schemes which together provide a major part of the country's wheat crop need to be rehabilitated or completed.

67. A large portion of the cost of restoring traditional irrigation systems can be met under food-for-work programmes, which are provided for under the food sector of the appeal. Other infrastructural requirements total \$53.1 million over the 18-month period of the appeal within a provisional figure of \$157.8 million over five years. Modest technical assistance in irrigation planning and water management is included.

D. Rural development

68. Levels of productivity in the rural areas of Afghanistan are very low, partly because of the growing inadequacy of the rural infrastructure such as feeder roads, bridges, culverts and drainage systems and other local public works. Moreover, rural development operations have been severely constrained by security considerations, the scarcity of trained personnel and a lack of equipment and supplies. The appeal calls for aid totalling \$58 million over 18 months, within the global projected figure of \$131 million over five years. Most of the repair and reconstruction work will be carried out through simple labour-intensive methods often involving food or cash for work.

V. HEALTH PROGRAMMES AND WATER SUPPLY

A. Health

69. In public health, as in other spheres, Afghanistan falls clearly within the category of least developed countries. The health condition of the Afghan people is characterized by high infant mortality, with rates variously estimated at 182 to 260 per 1,000, malnutrition and a prevalence of diarrhoeal and respiratory diseases, including tuberculosis. Malaria is also a serious health hazard in much of the country. Many health facilities are no longer functioning, particularly in the rural areas where a number of the 147 basic health centres and the great majority of the 76 sub-centres which existed in 1978-1979 have since been destroyed. The training and supervision of health workers has been severely disrupted. Many preventive health programmes, including immunization, have been interrupted, and most people now have no access to simple curative care. The conflict has left many adults and children severely disabled.

70. A massive effort will be required to rehabilitate and restore a functioning health system even of a rudimentary kind. Co-operation between WHO, UNICEF and LRCS as well as NGOs is being strengthened to provide a coherent programme of support. The most pressing need is to restore a minimal level of health services through the rehabilitation of health facilities, including health posts, health centres, some regional and local hospitals and their equipment. Manpower needs in public health must be met by recruitment, training and retraining. A variety of preventive and curative services, such as immunisation, malaria control, diarrhoeal diseases control, tuberculosis control, prevention of blindness and nutritional support need to be strengthened. Epidemiological surveys for programme planning and other assessment and monitoring activities will be initiated. Once the logistic and supportive mechanisms to sustain restored health services have been put in place, the development of health systems which can meet the full range of the needs of the Afghan people can properly begin. These must tap, to the extent possible, the strong network of traditional medicine.

71. Requirements for the most basic restoration of the health infrastructure (some of which will also be met under rural development schemes) along with a whole range of other requirements, embracing both technical assistance and preventive and curative programmes related to specific diseases and the rehabilitation of the

disabled, have been estimated at \$64.2 million over 18 months, as indicated in annex IV, within a total of \$224.2 million for five years.

B. Disabled

72. Even before the conflicts of recent years, a considerable number of people, women and children in particular, were already disabled. War has added an estimated 300,000 to 500,000 persons to this category, making the issue a critical one. A comprehensive plan to create an infrastructure for vocational rehabilitation, training, employment and social integration in both urban and rural areas has to be developed. It is necessary, though, to fill the information gap as a matter of priority particularly concerning the extent of disability amongst children who have fallen victim either to the conflict or to health and nutritional problems. According to a conservative estimate, 1 in 10 children may be disabled. Given the magnitude of the problem, institutional approaches are not - in the short term at least - either practical or cost-effective. Solutions have to be found at village level, building upon community organizations. Information on the care and protection of victims at the family level must be disseminated. Low-cost aids and appliances should be introduced. Simultaneously, projects for the rehabilitation of the physically disabled should be set up on a pilot basis. As the required numbers of medical officers and paramedics are trained, the projects will be expanded accordingly. ICRC will have a major role to play in regard to the disabled population.

73. It should be remembered in this context that many areas have been mined. The highest priority must be given to their clearance, provisionally estimated to cost some \$9 million.

C. Water supply

74. Safe drinking water is a scarce commodity in rural and, to a lesser extent, in urban areas. Only 8 per cent of the rural population benefits from piped drinking water. The remaining population obtains its water from water catchment, rivers, hand-dug wells, etc. Most of these sources have deteriorated; for security reasons, major water supply programmes in rural areas have not been implemented. Efforts have to be concentrated on the supply of clean water to rural communities. Priority will be given to the repair, reconditioning and rehabilitation of existing water sources, creating new sources when there is no other alternative. In view of the varied topography and rugged terrain, various water supply systems will be used including protected hand-dug wells, bore wells with hand pumps and gravity-fed systems. Technical support, supplies and equipment will be provided and local communities will receive appropriate training. Although the water supply in Kabul has been improved, capital and technical assistance will also need to be extended to urban areas to increase the supply of water and improve sewerage disposal. The amount of \$20.7 million has been provided for water supply under the relief/rehabilitation phase over 18 months within a total of \$82 million for five years and \$79 million under the recovery phase. The redistribution of population makes this investment in water supply and sewerage necessary even at the recovery phase. This essential investment probably cannot be postponed until a later phase.

VI. HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURE

A. Human resources

75. The rehabilitation and recovery programme is aimed at revitalizing the productive sectors of the economy, primarily the agricultural sector. Simultaneously growth potential for the future must also be built up by investing in human resources. One of the basic thrusts should be the improvement of the quality of skilled personnel.

76. The literacy rate, which was already one of the lowest in the world, is estimated at between 10 and 15 per cent. Enrolment in primary and secondary schools has reportedly declined by 35 per cent and 8 per cent respectively. Less than 20 per cent of the population of primary school age is enrolled in schools. A large number of school buildings have been damaged or destroyed and the quality of education has suffered as a result of the shortage of qualified teachers and textbooks. In most rural areas, the process of formal education has practically come to a halt on account of the security situation, although traditional religious education has continued. Nevertheless, enrolment in vocational schools and institutions of higher education has increased, although this is limited to the capital and other urban areas.

77. While priority must be given to primary education in rural areas and particularly in those affected by the war, past experience has to be taken into account. For, despite large-scale assistance in the 1960s and 1970s for primary and secondary school improvement, success was limited. The participation and literacy rates did not match the scope of the aid. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the efforts undertaken in the last few years on behalf of Afghan refugees. Most of the school-age children, particularly girls, fail to attend or drop out. Many people of rural background do not perceive education as relevant to their needs and culture. Beneficiaries and local leaders must therefore be associated with the design, planning and implementation of educational programmes. As far as possible, teachers should be recruited and trained locally. In the longer term, measures have to be taken to re-establish effective teacher training.

78. Vocational training has been a permanent feature of assistance programmes on behalf of refugees. Several thousand skilled workers, as well as instructors, have been trained. The projects established for this purpose are being expanded pending the return of refugees. These include, in particular, crash vocational training programmes for essential public services. Efforts will be made also to attract qualified Afghans living abroad to participate in the reconstruction efforts.

79. After a fuller assessment of available facilities and needs, it will be possible to make proposals for the rehabilitation of existing institutions, the development of additional facilities and training programmes, training machinery and equipment needs, crash training courses and special programmes required for the rural sector. The long-term development of the vocational training system will need considerable capital and technical assistance resources beyond the scope of the present appeal.

80. Infrastructural assistance to the education sector concentrates on the rehabilitation of primary, secondary and vocational school buildings. Some attention will also be given to the rehabilitation of university-level training for the engineers and technicians required for the recovery effort. Technical assistance will include the strengthening of technician training at the university level as well as planning for the reconstruction of the educational sector as a whole. Provision is made in the appeal for \$50 million over an 18-month period within a total of \$81.3 million for both the relief and recovery phases over five years.

B. Culture

81. Afghans have fought to preserve their national identity and values. In keeping with the historic traditions of Afghanistan, it is essential to emphasize the cultural dimension of the reconstruction efforts, all the more so since millions of people have been uprooted and hundreds of thousands of children have grown up away from their habitual physical and social environment. Efforts should be undertaken as soon as possible to preserve and, when needed, restore the historical patrimony of the country. An inventory of monuments and objects has to be prepared if only to determine the extent of the damage. In any event, plans should be made to maintain or restore a number of important monuments, sites and museums, including well-known places such as the Timurid monuments of Herat, the Friday mosque, the minaret of Djam and the Buddhist site in Hadda. Similarly, the National Museum of Afghanistan in Kabul and other museums in the country may require special attention on the basis of inventories to be made.

82. The cost, including the training of personnel in museum development, is estimated at \$2.7 million. This sum does not include actual restoration costs tentatively estimated by UNESCO at \$40 million.

VII. COMMUNICATIONS, INDUSTRY AND NATURAL RESOURCES

A. Transport and communications

83. The primary mode of transport within Afghanistan is the road network consisting of 2,700 km of paved road and about 14,000 km of gravel and earth roads. As a land-locked country, Afghanistan is dependent on its neighbours for its foreign transit and trade. Infrastructure assistance would include the rehabilitation of some 1,000 km of paved central artery roads, particularly those linking the capital and other towns with Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the repair and maintenance of the rest of the network. The preservation of this basic infrastructure is essential for the successful implementation of the relief and recovery programme. Technical assistance is also envisaged in support of the planning and implementation of priority road improvement and maintenance activities. Rural feeder roads connecting the national system should be upgraded. The amount of \$42.4 million is provided for transport under relief and rehabilitation over 18 months within a total of \$97.7 million for five years.

B. Industry

84. The small manufacturing sector is based on the processing of domestic raw materials. The major manufacturing items are ginned cotton, cotton textiles, sugar, vegetable oil, cement, electricity and chemical fertilizer. As a result of a marked decline in cotton production, the output of ginned cotton and cotton textiles has declined sharply. Sugar production has almost ceased and cement production has also dropped. Assistance to the industrial sector should be primarily for the rehabilitation of agro-industries and a cement plant which is essential for the rehabilitation of storage facilities and other buildings. Public enterprises will receive technical assistance to improve their management practices. Technical assistance is, however, intended mainly to strengthen institutions providing credit and technical advisory services to small indigenous enterprises responsible for the generation of rural cash incomes and the provision of household and farm products and services. The amount of \$40.3 million has been provided for industry under relief and rehabilitation over 18 months within a total of \$87.8 million for five years.

C. Power

85. The output of electricity has grown mainly as a result of the installation of a large number of diesel plants. In addition, northern areas of the country import electricity. However, total installed capacity estimated at some 400 MW, remains small and annual per capita consumption is 60 kWh. At present only 6 per cent of the population has access to electricity. Assistance in this sector would concentrate on the rehabilitation of power production and its transmission to provincial towns. Related technical assistance in the training of personnel is required for the planning, management and operation of such schemes.

D. Mining

86. The major output of the mining sector consists of coal, natural gas and salt. There are substantial deposits of important metals including iron ore and copper. Reserves of petroleum, the exploitation of which is starting, are estimated at 20 million tons. Gas is, for the most part, exported and accounts for about half the export revenues. The production of coal has fallen sharply. Priority should, therefore, be given to increasing the use of existing capacity in this area as well as in the extraction of salt, principally to meet domestic demand.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUNDING ARRANGEMENTS

87. The needs of the Afghan people are so great and, in their broad dimensions, so clear that no uncertainty as to detail should deter the international community from an immediate and determined effort to redress them. The present appeal is a starting point on the road to recovery, and in setting out upon that road there must be no delay. Every step on the way will be closely monitored and it will be a prime task of the Co-ordinator to ensure that any necessary adjustments in

direction are carefully but firmly made. The situation, particularly in the early days, will inevitably be a rapidly changing one calling for flexibility and adaptability at every stage.

88. Simultaneously with this appeal the preparation must begin in the field, and specifically in the zones identified as suitable for early action, of precise plans and projects which can be implemented straight away. The role of NGOs will be particularly important in this regard, in view of their knowledge of the situation on the ground. Out of the long process of rehabilitation and recovery which will follow should emerge not only the return of those in exile and the restoration of self-reliance to the Afghan people but a firm base and infrastructure from which long-term activities can be launched.

89. In responding to this appeal, donors are urged to be not only generous and timely but flexible as well. While some donors may prefer to earmark their funds on an agency-by-agency basis, cash donations would be processed through the Afghanistan Emergency Fund (see para. 90 below); inputs of food or other contributions in kind, on the other hand, would be routed directly to the agency or programme concerned. The Co-ordinator should be informed immediately of such contributions so that he is at all times fully abreast of the information he needs concerning the resources made available. Only in this way can he fulfil the task of monitoring the international response to this appeal and its impact in terms of implementation from the very outset. The Co-ordinator should similarly be informed of contributions made bilaterally or through NGOs. It is particularly important that bilateral donors keep the Co-ordinator fully informed and make every effort to integrate their contributions into the overall rehabilitation and recovery plan.

90. An Afghanistan emergency fund to be administered by the Co-ordinator is being established to receive the cash contributions in order to meet the needs identified by him in terms of the financial and human resources required and to ensure the right degree of flexibility and rapid action. The Co-ordinator will be responsible for the presentation of a coherent programme, priority-setting and, as appropriate, allocations to programmes and agencies from within the Fund. This is required to ensure that the response to identified needs is accurate and effective and that waste, duplication and mis-spent effort are avoided. Furthermore, in view of the fast-evolving situation which, of necessity, calls for priorities to be adjusted to prevailing circumstances rapidly, it would be advantageous to place the unearmarked contributions at the disposal of the Co-ordinator. This would enable him, in consultation with the agencies concerned, to exercise the flexibility that the situation demands.

91. The implementation of so complex a programme in such changing circumstances will itself involve a whole variety of co-ordinating mechanisms and operational arrangements, both within Afghanistan and without. The Co-ordinator will be assisted at his headquarters by an inter-agency task force on which all the main concerned agencies will be represented, some of them - if the work-load justifies it - by staff seconded to the Co-ordinator's Office. Similar task-force arrangements will be instituted in the field where the Co-ordinator will be represented either by staff on mission from his headquarters or by a member of his staff stationed in the area concerned. Co-ordinating arrangements are also being

developed with NGOs and with donors. The common data-base which the Co-ordinator is establishing will serve as a central source of accurate information pertaining to Afghanistan for United Nations agencies, donors and other interested bodies and should provide a valuable and unique resource for many years to come.

92. A poet from the region once wrote:

"My friendship means that, should you need my help

However early in the day or late

You can rely on it - for here I stand

A saddled horse, expectant at your gate."

Ha'im

93. For the Afghan people it is already late in the day and friends are sorely needed. The international community is urged to act at once to demonstrate a friendship on which the Afghan people, who have suffered so much for so long, can now rely.

Table 1. Estimated relief-rehabilitation needs
for Afghanistan, 1988-1989

(In millions of US dollars)

	Relief/rehabilitation <u>needs</u>	
<u>Voluntary repatriation</u>		
Health	8.0	
Transport/logistics	169.4	
Water supply	3.0	
Household goods	5.0	
Shelter	22.0	
Agricultural inputs	4.8	
Agency operational support	<u>13.2</u>	225.4
<u>Food aid a/</u>		
Repatriation refugees/internally displaced persons	239.5	
Vulnerable groups	6.1	
School children	6.3	
Food-for-work programme	80.0	
Agency operational support	<u>3.5</u>	335.4
<u>Agriculture, irrigation, rural development</u>		
Agricultural inputs	164.5	
Agriculture	56.8	
Irrigation	53.1	
Rural development	<u>58.0</u>	332.4
<u>Social services</u>		
Health programmes	37.2	
Drugs and medicines	19.0	
Water supply	17.7	
Education	50.0	
Clearance of mines	<u>9.0</u>	132.9

Table 1 (continued)

Relief/rehabilitation
needs

Communications, industry and power

Transport/logistics ^a	42.4	
Communications	16.7	
Industry :	40.3	
Power	<u>29.9</u>	129.3

Administration and management

Planning and statistics	6.0	
Project formulation/monitoring	1.5	
Project management	0.5	
Monuments/culture survey	<u>2.7</u>	<u>10.7</u>
Total		<u>1 166.1</u>

a/ Includes ocean freight and overland/inland transport costs amounting to \$160 million for food aid deliveries to provincial capitals as well as distribution centres inside Afghanistan.

Table 2. Estimated rehabilitation-recovery needs
in Afghanistan, 1990-1993

(In millions of US dollars)

	Rehabilitation/recovery <u>needs</u>	
<u>Agriculture, irrigation, rural development</u>		
Agricultural inputs	143.0	
Agriculture	63.0	
Irrigation	104.7	
Rural development	<u>73.0</u>	383.7
<u>Social services</u>		
Health programmes	92.0	
Drugs and medicines	68.0	
Water supply	61.3	
Education	<u>31.3</u>	252.6
<u>Communications, industry and power</u>		
Transport/logistics	55.3	
Communications	41.6	
Industry	47.5	
Power	<u>41.9</u>	186.3
<u>Administration and management</u>		
Planning and statistics	14.0	
Project formulation/monitoring	2.0	
Project management	<u>1.0</u>	<u>17.0</u>
Total		<u>839.6</u>

Annex I

UNHCR VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION PROGRAMME

(In millions of US dollars)

A. Purchase of equipment/fixed costs

Transport/logistics

Purchase of equipment

In-country transport:

75 trucks (7.8 ton) plus spares

4.25

50 project vehicles

0.80

Warehouse construction/improvement

3.00

Fixed costs (18 months):

Mechanical workshop services

Vehicle park, fuel and lubricants

3.00

Subtotal

11.05

Domestic needs/household support

Purchase of equipment

Household goods (quilts, stoves, buckets)

5.00

Water

Purchase of equipment

Water system construction/improvement

3.00

Health/nutrition

Fixed costs (18 months)

General health services

8.00

Shelter/other infrastructure

Purchase of equipment

Refugee shelter:

Tents/tarpaulins

15.00

Community/other infrastructure:

Tents (health)

Tarpaulins/tents (storage)

Prefabs (administration)

2.00

Fixed costs (18 months)

Site/land preparation/road improvement

5.00

Subtotal

22.00

/...

Agency operational support

Purchase of equipment

General project management services:

Communications costs -

Telex, telephone, radio

0.60

Vehicles (50)

0.90

Office supplies

0.20

Furniture

0.10

Fixed costs (18 months)

General project management services

Staff costs

- salaries/related costs (UNHCR)

5.00

- salaries/related costs (WFP)

1.40

Services - aircraft charter

3.00

Other agency administrative support

2.00

Subtotal

13.20

Total, equipment/fixed costs

62.25B. Non-food budget module

(250,000 beneficiaries)

Transport/logistics

In-country transport:

Transport contract (trucks)

8.00

Fuel/lubricants, transport/storage

5.00

Refugee labour

0.20

Subtotal

13.20Crop production

Agricultural inputs

0.40

Total, non-food module

13.60For 3,000,000 beneficiaries

Equipment/fixed costs

62.25

Non-food module x 12

163.20

Total

225.45

Annex II**ESTIMATED TOTAL COST TO WFP TO COVER 18 MONTHS' FOOD NEEDS**

(In millions of US dollars)

	<u>Food cost</u>	<u>Transport</u>	<u>Support costs</u>	<u>Total</u>
Repatriation of refugees and assistance to internally displaced	117 396 000	122 040 000	-	239 436 000
Rehabilitation, food for work	41 520 600	32 497 200	6 000 000	80 017 800
Vulnerable groups	3 622 500	2 457 000	-	6 079 500
School children	<u>2 812 500</u>	<u>2 520 000</u>	<u>1 000 000</u>	<u>6 332 500</u>
Total	<u>165 351 300</u>	<u>159 514 200</u>	<u>7 000 000</u>	<u>331 865 800</u>
Estimated total cost to cover staff requirements, material, equipment and running costs in Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran				<u>3 531 800</u>
Estimated total cost of 18-month operation				<u>335 397 600</u>

Annex III

FAO ESTIMATES OF RELIEF-REHABILITATION NEEDS IN AGRICULTURE,
1988-1989

(In millions of US dollars)

Relief/rehabilitation
needs

Agricultural inputs

Seeds:

Wheat	25.0
Cotton	2.5
Vegetables	2.0

Fertilizers:

Urea	9.0
Phosphates	25.0

Farm tools	75.0
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Small tractors/draught animals	22.0
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Animal vaccines	1.5
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Animal feed	2.5
-------------	-----

Total, agricultural inputs	164.5
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Agricultural infrastructure and services

Irrigation rehabilitation	30.0
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Credit	2.0
--------	-----

Research	1.0
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Other technical assistance projects	5.5
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Total, agricultural infrastructure and services	38.5
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Grand total	203.0
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Annex IV

WHO/UNICEF ESTIMATED RELIEF-REHABILITATION NEEDS
FOR HEALTH SECTOR, 1988-1989

(In millions of US dollars)

	<u>Relief/rehabilitation needs</u>
Restoration of health facilities	8.0
Essential drugs and vaccines	19.0
Logistics for health service	5.0
Health manpower development	4.5
Preventative/curative development	18.2
Immunization	5.0
Malaria control	7.0
Diarrhoeal disease control	1.5
Tuberculosis control	2.5
Nutrition support	1.5
Prevention of blindness	0.5
Rehabilitation of disabled	0.2
Surveys/planning/management	<u>9.5</u>
Total	<u>64.2</u>

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ACTION DATA SUMMARY REPORT

RECORD ID: 8804455

DOC ACTION OFFICER

CAO ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED

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**National Security Council
The White House**

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88 JUN 17 P 2: 26

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Perito	<u>1</u>	<u>Rmp</u>	<u>I</u>
Marybel Batjer	_____	_____	_____
Paul Stevens	<u>2</u>	<u>pm</u>	<u>I</u>
John Negroponte	<u>3</u>	_____	_____
Colin Powell	<u>4</u>	<u>ca</u>	_____
Paul Stevens	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
West Wing Desk	<u>5</u>	<u>2 p 6/23</u>	<u>N</u>
NSC Secretariat	<u>6</u>	_____	<u>N</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: **VP** **Baker** Other _____

COMMENTS

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TO: POWELL

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

alb 2/8/10

FROM: TAHIR-KHELI

DOC DATE: 16 JUN 88
SOURCE REF:

KEYWORDS: AFGHANISTAN
REFUGEES

UN
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

PERSONS:

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF UN APPEAL FOR HUMANITARIAN & ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR
AFGHANISTAN

ACTION: NOTED BY POWELL DUE DATE: 20 JUN 88 STATUS: C

STAFF OFFICER: TAHIR-KHELI LOGREF:

FILES: WH NSCIF: CODES:

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FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO
TAHIR-KHELI

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